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Implications of Brexit to the Asia-Pacific region: 
with a focus on least developed countries 
LOUIS GRAHAM, ARUN JACOB1 AND ANDERS K. MOLLER 
Summary  
Brexit might affect exports of some countries in the Asia-Pacific region disproportionately more than 
others. Simulation results, under different Brexit scenarios, show that the potential reduction in trade 
faced by least developed countries (LDCs) of the region can range from 16% to 50% of their current 
export value to the UK in key sectors such as fish, clothes, textiles and footwear. Simulations also show 
that it is the larger developing countries from the region that would benefit from any trade diversion that 
ensues in these sectors. Countries with higher exposure to Brexit induced risks need to engage in deeper 
analyses of the extent of such impacts and brace themselves for proactive discussions with the UK in 
order to limit negative impacts. 
 
 Highlights  
 Brexit might affect trade of some countries in the region disproportionately more than others.  Sri 
Lanka, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Turkey, Pakistan, French Polynesia, Fiji, Maldives, India, Hong 
Kong, China;  are found to have higher chance of being exposed to direct trade disruption risk, 
owing to their relatively high proportion of exports to the UK. 
 It is uncertain whether UK will continue to provide preferential access to LDCs and developing 
countries after the Brexit. The paper runs simulation exercise under two scenarios.  First 
simulation changes all UK tariffs to current MFN applied tariffs of the EU. Under this scenario,  
LDCs in Asia and the Pacific might witness a reduction of their exports to the UK at the range of 
30% to 50% in key sectors such as fish, clothes, textiles and footwear.  
 Under the second scenario of UK removing all tariffs unilaterally to all countries, the LDCs in the 
region will face significant preference erosions. The simulation suggests that trade diversion from 
LDCs can still result in a potential reduction of 16 % to 48% of their current export value in key 
export sectors.  
 Asia-Pacific LDCs, especially Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Nepal, who have 
a significant reliance on UK market for exports, will need to be wary of potential trade 
disruptions. Simulations also show that it is the larger developing countries from the region that 
would benefit from any trade diversion that ensues in these sectors. Countries with higher 
exposure to Brexit induced risks to engage in deeper analyses of the extent of such impacts and 
brace themselves for proactive discussions with the UK in order to limit negative impacts. LDCs 
may consider jointly negotiating for the continuation of their DFQF access to the UK.   
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 Countries might want to think of ways to transform Brexit into an opportunity to renegotiate trade 
agreements with the UK that are mutually beneficial and integrates emerging issues in trade such 
as non-tariff measures, ecommerce and digital trade. 
 The Asia-Pacific region should carefully analyze the political economy factors that led to the 
Brexit in order to avoid ‘Brexit type’ events in the region, which could potentially hamper the 
regional integration efforts. 
 Investment and ODA could be other two channels through which the Brexit can impact the 
region. Countries that have significant investments in the UK  might face some ripple effects of 
Brexit through the investment channel. At the same time, the top recipients in the region of UK 
FDI might see a fall in the investment if the UK investors cut down on their investment due to 
economic uncertainty. In terms of ODA contributions, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and 
Pakistan receive substantial ODA from the UK (as percentage of GDP) and any slow-down of the 
British economy can result in fall in these contributions. 
Introduction 
After the result of the  referendum within the UK on European Union membership on July 23rd 2016, the 
UK seems all set to leave the European Union and possibly the European Single Market. The new British 
Prime Minister Theresa May announced that the formal negotiation process will begin in late March 
2017, which means that the UK is likely to formally leave the EU in 2019
2
.  Little is yet known about 
what shape or form the exit negotiations will take and whether Britain will retain access to the Single 
Market (a so-called ‘soft Brexit’) or have to leave completely and then attempt to negotiate new trade 
agreements with the EU and other countries (‘hard Brexit’). The recent statement by the British Prime 
Minister has hinted at the prospect of a ‘hard Brexit’3.    
 
These uncertainties have certainly rattled international markets, including a historic slide in British Pound 
exchange rate, and present significant threats to global markets in the future. Nevertheless, Brexit may 
also present opportunities for UK trading partners as it might open up ways to negotiate or renegotiate 
trade agreements. In this commentary, we will first provide a brief overview of the potential threats 
associated with Brexit and an analysis of UK trade relations with Asia-Pacific, emphasizing which 
countries have the highest exposure to the UK market. We conduct partial equilibrium simulations of 
selected sectors of significance to LDCs in the Asia- Pacific region to gauge the impact of removal of 
preferences given by UK to these countries.  Together with comments on FDI and ODA flows, the 
commentary highlights some of the challenges and opportunities that Brexit potentially presents for the 
Asia-Pacific region, especially its LDCs. 
  
1. Impact of Brexit on Trade  
Europe and the UK are important trading partners for the Asia-Pacific region. In 2015, the EU accounted 
for 19.2% of total exports from the Asia-Pacific region, while the UK by itself accounted for 2.2%. Some 
of the region’s biggest bilateral trading partners with the UK include Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Bangladesh, 
and the Solomon Islands (in terms of exports to the UK). However, uncertainty remains over what trade 
relation the UK will maintain with the EU, and indeed whether it will adopt the EU’s bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements or revert to MFN status under the WTO. As Thirlwell (2016) points out, 
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political uncertainty alone may cause slower UK and EU growth in the short-term which will lower 
imports from trading partners. 
Figure 1.1: Value of Asia-Pacific exports to the UK and EU (2011-2015) in USD millions 
 
Source: UN COMMTRADE DATA accessed through WITS.    Note: Calculated using mirror data 
 
Some analysts argue that the Asia-Pacific region as a whole is unlikely to be affected much in the short 
run due to its relatively low reliance on exports to the UK
4
.  However, there are concerns that even if 
Brexit does not immediately impact regional economies, it may further reduce global trade growth which 
has already been slowing down in recent years (Iskyan, 2016a)
5
.  First, trade disruptions may slow down 
economic growth in the rest of the EU which would slacken demand for imports from European trade 
partners. Second, a British exit from the EU – which is the largest trading block in the world – may reflect 
(and reinforce) a general increase of protectionist and anti-globalization attitudes. In turn, this may pose 
challenges for future trade integration efforts.. A gradual slowdown in globalization would not only harm 
economies that are highly dependent on global trade, such as Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong, China 
(where trade accounts for 138%, 351% and 439% of GDP, respectively)
6
,  but also – in turn – reduce 
long-term growth prospects for the region. A further uncertainty lies in whether the UK will adopt the 
same preferential access to developing and LDC countries. Mendez-Parra et al (2016) estimate that the 
combined effect of a devalued GBP and lower GDP growth can result in a reduction of 500 million GBP 
worth of imports from LDCs. 
 
Figure 1.2:  Share of Asia-Pacific exports to the UK and the EU, 2015 
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Under the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) system, developing countries are granted 
greater access to EU markets where – in effect – approximately two-thirds of all product categories have 
their tariffs lowered or abolished for developing-country exporters. An additional system, the “Everything 
but Arms” (EBA) arrangement, grants duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) access on all goods except arms 
and ammunitions to LDCs
7
.  The issue, then, is whether or not the UK will extend the GSP allowances to 
developing countries and DFQF preferences to LDC countries, as its absence may severely compromise 
existing trade.   Therefore, whether or not the UK replicates EU trade regulations (including the GSP and 
EBA system) is the biggest risk associated with Brexit from a trade perspective.  
If EU regulations and trade agreements are not “grandfathered in,” the UK might have to trade under 
WTO MFN rules while negotiating new trade deals
8
. It is moreover uncertain whether it is even possible 
for the UK to take over existing EU trade agreements, even on a temporary basis
9
.  This presents 
significant economic risk to nations which rely heavily on exports to the UK, as reverting to MFN 
standards during negotiations will lead to higher tariffs and NTMs applied to goods previously liberalized 
under EU trade deals and (thus) result in significant trade disruptions. 
Some analysts have predicted a relatively mild impact on Asian economies, arguing that “even a 25 
percent decline in U.K. imports would knock less than 0.2 percent off from regional GDP” (Simpson, 
2016). In China, for example, UK exports only amount to some 0.5% of GDP and so an anticipated 25% 
reduction in UK imports would only shave off around 1.25% in GDP of China. However, economies like 
Cambodia, Viet Nam and Hong Kong, China have strong trade ties with the UK stand to see a higher 
impact on economic growth. It is also speculated that the impact of exporters to the UK “may be more 
immediate if an anticipated slowdown in the UK economy materializes” (Cohen and Gumede, 2016).  
The top 10 countries with the highest UK export exposure in the Asia-Pacific region (in terms of exports 
as a percentage of their total exports) are summarized in the table 1. These are the economies at highest 
risk of being impacted by restricted trade with the UK, as a significant proportion of their global exports 
are sold in British markets. The table also summarizes the main components of their exports, based on 
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standard product grouping consisting of 1-14 HS categories at the 2-digit level. Six countries rely 
primarily on exporting textile and cloth products, while others also export large amount of e.g. footwear, 
transportation goods, and mechanical and electrical machinery.  On the converse, negotiating new trade 
deals with the UK that improves trade relations and make them more favourable to developing nations 
may also present a window of opportunity to boost exports and economic growth. In particular, 
developing countries may wish to identify specific industries where value may be gained from greater 
access to UK markets.  One such example is agricultural goods, which faces relatively high tariffs in the 
EU by developed country standards.  
Table 1: Top ten UK trade partners in Asia-Pacific by export share in 2015 
Country Exports to the 
UK as % of 
total  exports 
Top exports to the UK 
Sri Lanka 10.75% 
Textile and cloth (84.09%), Plastic and rubber products 
(4.18%), and vegetables (4.01%) 
Cambodia* 10.26% Textile and cloth (75.96%), and Footwear (17.52%)  
Bangladesh* 9.99% Textile and cloth (93.52%), and Animal products (2.78%)  
Turkey 9.11% 
Textile and cloth (24.46%), transportation goods 
(24.01%), mechanical and electrical machinery (19.68%), 
and stone and class products (12.14%). 
Pakistan 7.83% 
Textile and cloth (80.29%), Vegetables (5.77%), hide & 
skin products (2.79%), and misc. goods including toys, 
optical equipment, furniture and other manufactured items 
(6.17%) 
French Polynesia 7.58% 
Paintings, drawings etc. (97.99%), stone and glass 
products (0.85%) 
Fiji 6.73% Food products (93.15%), textile and cloth (1.96%). 
Maldives 5.72% Animal Products (78.60%), food products (19.51%). 
India 4.54% 
Textile and cloth (26.06%), mechanical and electrical 
machinery (13.04%), chemicals (10.86%), stone and glass 
products (7.81%) and metals (6.06%). 
Hong Kong, China 4.08% 
Mechanical and electrical machinery (25.19%), Stone and 
glass products (18.91%), textile and cloth (8.46%), wood 
products (7.66%), misc. goods including toys, clocks and 
watches, optical equipment, art, and furniture (24.96%). 
Source: WITS 
* = LDC  
 
 Another measure reflecting on trade dependency is the share of export in countries GDP.  From this 
perspective, Bangladesh is for example relatively less dependent on trading with the UK than Cambodia, 
Vietnam and the Solomon Islands (which together with Papua New Guinea make up the top five). 
 
Table 2: Top ten UK trade partners in Asia-Pacific by export (as a % of partner GDP) 
Partner 
Exports to the 
UK (as % of 
country’s 
GDP) 
Cambodia 8.63% 
Vietnam 3.16% 
Solomon Islands 2.35% 
Bangladesh 2.26% 
Papua New Guinea* 1.60% 
Sri Lanka 1.42% 
Turkey 1.22% 
Fiji 1.22% 
Hong Kong, China 1.10% 
Thailand 0.92% 
Source: WITS and ESCAP calculations 
*Based on 2014 data 
Note: excludes Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Guam and New Caledonia due to lack of data 
 
A further trade concern is the implication of Brexit to existing trade between Asia-Pacific economies and 
the EU as a whole. The UK has been a vocal promoter of creating free trade agreements between the EU 
and other economies, and there is a concern that the EU could become more trade restrictive after their 
exit (Panda, 2016). This could potentially influence some of the 16 FTAs between the EU and the 
different Asian economies that are currently in various stages of implementation
10
. Moreover, the political 
uncertainty surrounding the future of the block creates risk of further destabilization in the Single Market 
which, in turn, may disrupt EU trade
11
.  Cambodia, Vietnam, Bangladesh and the Solomon Islands are 
also among the largest EU trading partners in Asia-Pacific  region (in terms of exports as a % of their 
GDP),  but the top ten also include several central-European economies while the Marshall Islands tops 
the list with nearly 228% of GDP, suggesting a very large dependency on exports to the EU. These 
countries thus face significant risk of being affected by any potential changes in EU trade policies.  
 
1.1 Impact on LDCs: A simulation exercise 
LDCs are of particular interest since trade (and, hence, economic growth) plays a vital function in their 
national development, and it is often harder for them to diversify into new markets and products easily. 
The exports to the UK constitute approximately 2% of the total combined GDP of the Asia-Pacific LDCs, 
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with this share reaching approximately 9% in Cambodia and 2% in Bangladesh
12
.    Most of them rely 
heavily on textile and clothes exports (HS code 50-63), which account for between 66% and 94% of the 
country’s exports to UK (see table 3). The current MFN tariffs of EU in Textile and cloth sector, footwear 
sector, animal product sector and wood product sectors stands at 5.96, 11.06, 06 and 2.23 % respectively. 
So these might be the levels of tariffs that can potentially get imposed on these sectors, if the preferential 
access to LDCs is discontinued by the UK. Some of these tariff rates, especially in textile and cloth and 
footwear sectors, can significantly erode the competitiveness of exports from LDCs. The partial 
equilibrium simulation exercise in the next section provides further evidence on the magnitude of trade 
disruptions. 
Table 3: Top LDC trade partners in Asia-Pacific by export share and top two export industries 
Country Exports of the 
country to the 
UK as % of its 
global exports 
Top two export industries Current EU MFN 
rates (simple 
average) 
Cambodia 10.26% 
Textile and cloth (75.96%) 5.96 
Footwear (17.52%) 11.06 
Bangladesh 9.99% 
Textile and cloth (93.52%) 5.96 
Animal products (2.78%) 0.06 
Nepal 3.39% 
Textile and cloth (75.96%) 5.96 
Wood products (5.08%) 2.23 
Lao PDR 1.48% 
Textile and cloth (75.96%) 5.96 
Footwear (9.73%) 11.06 
Myanmar 1.26% 
Textile and cloth (75.96%) 5.96 
Animal products (18.57%) 0.06 
Source: WITS 
  
 
1.1.1 Methodology and Data 
The paper conducts simulations using a single market partial equilibrium model implemented by the 
SMART software. SMART looks at one market (in this case UK) and one product at a time. Using import 
demand elasticity, export supply elasticity and the Armington elasticity (which governs the 
substitutability between different varieties of product coming from different countries), SMART 
simulates the impact of a variation in tariff on bilateral trade flows.   The paper estimates the impact of a 
removal of tariff preferences given to LDCs by the UK under two scenarios. First scenario assumes that 
the UK will employ the current MFN applied rates of the EU to all countries including LDCs. The second 
scenario assumes that UK will unilaterally reduce all its tariffs to zero for all products to all its trade 
partners.  We use the SMART simulation methodology that allows use of user’s own data to conduct this 
analysis
13
.   
The following assumptions are used in these simulations. The import demand elasticities of the EU are 
estimated and used for the UK for each of the product categories.  The Armington Elasticity for each 
product is obtained from Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) version 5
14
. The trade import values of 
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the UK for 2015 are used as the baseline case (or the counterfactual) and the simulation derives the 
percentage change in trade value from this baseline. For each of the exporter country-product pair the 
simulations provide the total trade effect that comprises of trade creation  and trade diversion effects. 
Hence, for a tariff increase scenario, we can estimate how much trade gets reduced due to the overall 
increase in prices due to the tariff (the trade creation). Also, the model estimates how much of the existing 
trade from a specific exporter, whose exports face tariff increase, gets diverted to other exporters (trade 
diversion). We conduct simulation exercise for 5 HS2 digit product categories (namely, Fish; Apparel 
And Clothing Accessories-Knitted; Apparel And Clothing Accessories-Not-Knitted; Textile Articles ; and 
Footwear) that comprises of 95% of Asia –Pacific LDCs’ exports to the UK in 2015. 
 
 
 
1.1.2 Results 
Table 5 and 6 summarizes the simulation results from SMART. The table 5 provides the total trade 
impact of the potential tariff increase following Brexit for the LDCs in the Asia-Pacific region
15
.  This 
scenario assumes that UK imposes the current MFN applied rates of the EU to all countries (defined as 
scenario 1). Hence, the LDCs lose the DFQF preferences and developing countries lose their GSP tariff 
preferences and all other countries also lose any preferential access that they receive currently to the UK 
market. This means that all countries need to separately renegotiate trade deals with the UK under this 
scenario. Hence, this scenario is useful to measure the potential impact for the interim period when UK 
will be negotiating trade deals with countries. Scenario 2 assumes that UK will unilaterally reduce all 
tariffs to all countries. While this would have a high trade creation effect worldwide, it can lead to a high 
degree of trade diversion from LDCs due to ensuing erosion of preferences.   
The simulation results show that selected sectors that matters the most to the Asia-Pacific LDCs will be 
hard hit by a removal of preferential access to the UK market. Under scenario 1 (see table 4), the fish 
sector can see a reduction of 38% of the current export value, while various sub-sectors under textile and 
clothe categories may see a reduction of export value of the range from 30% to 52%. Under scenario 2 
(see table 5),  fish sector in Asia-Pacific LDCs might experience a reduction  of about 25 % in their 
current export values. While in the other top export categories, the reduction in export value can range 
from 17 % to 49 %. For example, a 50% reduction in value of exports to the UK from Cambodia and 
Bangladesh translates to approximately 4% and 1% reduction in their current GDP. Many of these sectors 
are very labour intensive and a contraction in these sectors can have high impact on employment.  Hence 
these disruptions can be quite significant in these countries. 
Table 4.  : Scenario 1 : Potential trade disruptions in Asia Pacific LDCs (APLDCSs) due to UK 
raising all tariffs to EU MFN rates 
HS code (Item) 
Total Trade 
Effect 
Trade 
Creation 
Trade 
Diversion 
Trade Value 
(2015) in 
1000 USD 
Potential 
percentage 
change in 
export 
value to 
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the UK 
due to 
Brexit 
3 (Fish) -49122 -17586 -31533 127719.05 -38.46 
61 (Apparel And Clothing 
Accessories-Knitted) 
-934287.62 -266760.81 -667501.75 2417640 -38.64 
62 (Apparel And Clothing 
Accessories-Not-Knitted) 
-900823.18 -247878.31 -652944.87 2012436.62 -44.76 
63 (Textile Articles ) -22455 -9840 -12595 76743.27 -29.25 
64 (Footwear) -138831.78 -23911.74 -114920.03 265229.75 -52.34 
Source: Author’s calculation using SMART simulation tool 
 
Table 5 : Scenario 2 : Potential trade disruptions in Asia Pacific LDCs (APLDCSs) due to UK 
unilaterally reducing all tariffs to zero 
HS code (Item) Total Trade 
Effect 
Trade 
Creation 
Trade 
Diversion 
Trade Value 
(2015) in 
1000 USD 
Potential 
percentage 
change in 
export 
value to 
the UK 
due to 
Brexit 
3 (Fish) -31536 8 -31545 127719.1 -24.6917 
61 (Apparel And Clothing 
Accessories-Knitted) -670441 0 -670441 2417640 -27.7312 
62 (Apparel And Clothing 
Accessories-Not-Knitted) -653207 0 -653207 2012437 -32.4585 
63 (Textile Articles ) -12778 0 -12778 76743.27 -16.6503 
64 (Footwear) -128966 192.5844 -129159 265229.8 -48.6243 
Source: Author’s calculation using SMART simulation tool 
The simulation also shows who benefits from the potential reduction of preferences to the Asia-Pacific 
LDCs from the associated trade diversion from these countries. As shown in table 6 and 7, it is mostly the 
larger developing countries from the Asia and Pacific region that might stand to gain the most from the 
preference erosion of LDCs under both scenarios. 
Table 6.  Top 5 countries that stand to gain the most from trade diversion in specific sectors under 
scenario 1 
3 (Fish) 61 (Apparel 
And Clothing 
Accessories-
Knitted) 
62 (Apparel 
And Clothing 
Accessories-
Not-Knitted) 
63 (Textile 
Articles ) 
64 (Footwear) 
China        China        China        China        China        
India       India      India        India        India        
Russian 
Federation   
Sri Lanka   
Vietnam      United States        Indonesia    
Indonesia    Vietnam   
Sri Lanka    
Hong Kong, 
China     Vietnam      
Thailand     Indonesia Indonesia    Other Asia, nes      Thailand     
             Source: Author’s calculation using SMART simulation tool 
 
Table 7.  Top 5 countries that stand to gain the most from trade diversion in specific sectors under 
scenario 2 
3 (Fish) 61 (Apparel 
And Clothing 
Accessories-
Knitted) 
62 (Apparel 
And Clothing 
Accessories-
Not-Knitted) 
63 (Textile 
Articles ) 
64 (Footwear) 
Russian 
Federation   China        China        
China        
China        
China        India        India        India        India        
India        Sri Lanka    Vietnam      United States        Indonesia    
Faeroe Islands       Vietnam      Sri Lanka    
Hong Kong, 
China     Vietnam      
Indonesia    Indonesia    Indonesia    Vietnam      Thailand     
            Source: Author’s calculation using SMART simulation tool 
 
Simulation results show significant trade diversions from the Asia-Pacific LDCs in their main export 
product categories.  It is important that these countries be mindful of these potential trade disruptions and 
its subsequent impact on their economies. Some of the LDCs are already initiating talks with the UK on 
potential post-Brexit bilateral FTA
16
.  It is important that LDCs jointly try to push for continued 
concessions to the UK market.  In any case, LDCs should conduct further research on the implications of 
trade disruptions in specific sectors following the Brexit and prepare contingency plans in case of such 
disruptions. 
 
2. Other channels of impact : FDI and ODA 
 
Brexit would affect the Asia-Pacific region through other channels like Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
and Official Development Assistance (ODA). These should be carefully monitored and responded to by 
policy makers.  
Similar to the uncertainty surrounding the future of UK trade regulations, it is unknown under what 
regulatory standards the UK will continue to engage in global investment. This is likely to lower both 
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inwards and outwards FDI in the short-run due to the uncertainties surrounding Brexit. This would affect 
large Asia-pacific economies like China, India and Australia, but also smaller developing countries like 
Pakistan and Kazakhstan. For some of these countries, UK is an important source of FDI and the impact 
of Brexit through the FDI channel can be quite significant. In the short run, market uncertainties can 
cause most investors to hold off on capital investments while awaiting the outcome of formal Brexit 
negotiations. 
In the long-run, foreign firms – particularly in financial services – may also wish to divest or invest 
outside of UK due to the increased supply-side costs associated with the UK potentially losing access to 
the European single market (also known as a ‘hard Brexit’17).  Leading investors from India and China18 
are expected to scale down or relocate in case they lose that access. Similarly, Japan (which is the top 
investor in the UK) has warned that unless the UK pursues a ‘soft Brexit’ (where the UK remains part of 
the European Single Market), Japanese firms may pull out
19
.  This has led some researchers to estimate 
that FDI inflows to the UK will fall by at least 22% in the next decade
20
.  The immediately future is 
therefore likely to see a slow-down in outward FDI to the UK from top investor countries in Asia-Pacific 
(namely, Japan; India; Australia; China; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Hong Kong, China; Singapore; 
Iran, Islamic Republic of;  and the Russian Federation
21
). 
ODA is another area of possible concern for developing countries in the wake of the post-Brexit world. In 
relative terms, the UK is one of the most generous bilateral donors, annually spending 0.7% of GDP on 
ODA
22
 and a generous contributor to Aid for Trade
23
. This includes development assistance implemented 
by the EU on behalf of member states, which would likely be re-directed after Britain withdraws from the 
EU. Afghanistan and Nepal are the largest dependents on British ODA 
24
(as a percentage of GDP). As 
UK shifts towards providing ODA independently of the EU, these countries may stand to gain further. 
However, Afghanistan, India and Myanmar rely significantly on EU aid and will therefore need to be 
aware of possible contraction in ODA if the loss in UK funding via the EU is not made up for through 
direct funding. Similarly, direct recipient of British ODA stand to gain less if the UK economy slows 
down or lapses into recession post-Brexit.  
3. Lessons from Brexit and concluding thoughts 
There are many potential reasons for the shock outcome of Brexit, which will no doubt be the source of 
much debate in the years ahead. The significance of this for regional integration efforts in Asia-Pacific 
may be that they should be cautious while proceeding with deeper integration efforts. Regional 
organizations such as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have until now primarily focused on regional cooperation and 
economic integration, agreements such as free movement of skilled labour within the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) and other future initiatives may face an electoral backlash if the political or economic 
environment of the region changes dramatically. Hence, the reasons of Brexit need to be further analyzed 
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by regional integration efforts in the region and identify ways to mitigate risks of Brexit type events in the 
region
25
. 
Many analysts have speculated that Brexit will have limited overall impact on markets in Asia and the 
Asia-Pacific as a whole. However, countries with stronger export dependencies on the UK such as Sri 
Lanka, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Turkey, Pakistan, and French Polynesia will require pro-active policy 
making to either negotiate new trade agreements with Britain or look to develop new markets in the rest 
of the EU and beyond. Future trade relations will be of particular importance to LDCs with significant 
exports to UK (Cambodia, Bangladesh, Nepal, Lao and Myanmar), which may need to diversify their 
export industries and destinations. The simulations under different scenarios clearly showed that the 
LDCs can potentially face huge disruptions to their trade with UK, if they lose preferential access or face 
erosion of preferences. These trade disruptions can be of the order of 16%-50 % of current trade value to 
the UK in key sectors such as fish, textiles, clothing and footwear. The larger developing countries of the 
region stand to gain most from ensuing trade diversions. 
In addition to short-term uncertainty and potential long-term impacts, countries and companies doing 
business with the UK should “brace themselves for a bureaucratic nightmare” as new regulations will be 
enacted and modified while the regulatory landscape evolves (Cohen and Gumede 2016). This may for 
example require renegotiating contracts and dealing with new visa regulations. Regional impacts from 
Brexit appear muted for now, and the UK will remain a member of the EU for at least another two years 
while their future relationship is negotiated; however, there is considerable concern for future volatility 
which may prove difficult to weather given the continued fragility of global market recovery
26
.   
Nevertheless, as highlighted in this paper, Brexit may also turn out to have a significant silver lining. The 
exit from the European Union may require the UK to quickly renegotiate existing FTAs and will most 
certainly require them to request deals with new partners. This would present a moment of opportunity for 
Asia-Pacific – particularly for economies with a heavy reliance on trade – to negotiate and renegotiate 
more favourable trade terms. These trade deals can be deeper than existing EU agreements and can 
include emerging issues such as non-tariff measures and ecommerce. Similarly, the potential slow-down 
in FDI inflows and outflows from the UK may pave the way for FTAs that allow for easier flow of capital 
and labour, but the desirability of the UK as an investment market will be highly dependent on whether 
they maintain access to the European Single Market. Lastly, developing countries with ODA-relations to 
the UK may wish to explore options in the wake of likely disruptions to development aid flow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 See discussion in Moeller (2017) on some relevant lessons to south-east asia. 
26
 Source: ADB (2016). 
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Annex  
Table A.1: Detailed Simulation Results : Potential trade disruptions in the Asia-Pacific LDCs 
(APLDC) due to UK raising all tariffs to EU MFN rates (Scenario 1) 
HS2 Product Exporter Value of exports in 
2015 to the UK 
(1000s of USD) 
Potential percentage 
change in export value 
to the UK due to Brexit 
3 
(Fish) 
APLDC 127719.05 -38.46 
Bangladesh 98434.89 -44.14 
Myanmar 29152.03 -19.51 
World 2568938.50 -9.70 
61 
(Apparel 
And 
Clothing 
Accessories-
Knitted) 
 
APLDC 2417640.00 -38.64 
Bangladesh 1684334.63 -37.10 
Cambodia 676942.81 -42.41 
Lao PDR 17995.54 -43.40 
Myanmar 31069.78 -37.85 
Nepal 7297.23 -36.93 
World 13392727.00 -7.52 
62 (Apparel APLDC 2012436.63 -44.76 
And 
Clothing 
Accessories-
Not-Knitted) 
  
Afghanistan 5.57 -34.57 
Bangladesh 1549896.88 -44.03 
Cambodia 357700.53 -45.95 
Lao PDR 25689.72 -49.09 
Myanmar 72542.30 -52.65 
Nepal 6601.67 -48.01 
World 13128625.00 -6.85 
63 (Textile 
Articles ) 
 
APLDC 76743.27 -29.26 
Bangladesh 69050.34 -28.18 
Cambodia 7153.87 -39.11 
Nepal 537.66 -36.64 
World 2552987.50 -9.88 
64(Footwear) 
 
APLDC 265229.75 -52.34 
Bangladesh 21228.54 -39.28 
Cambodia 236497.84 -53.13 
Lao PDR 4939.77 -79.19 
Myanmar 2472.84 -37.06 
Nepal 90.75 -3.46 
World 7321574.50 -4.12 
Source: Author’s calculation using SMART simulation tool 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2: Detailed Simulation Results: Potential trade disruptions in Asia Pacific LDCs (APLDC) 
due to UK unilaterally reducing all tariffs to zero (Scenario 2) 
HS2 Product Exporter Value of exports in 
2015 to the UK 
(1000s of USD) 
Potential percentage 
change in export value 
to the UK due to Brexit 
3 
(Fish) 
APLDC 127719.1 -24.6917 
Bangladesh 98434.89 -28.4035 
Myanmar 29152.03 -12.3525 
Vanuatu 132.137 18.16297 
World 2568939 6.48845 
61 
(Apparel 
And Clothing 
Accessories-
Knitted) 
 
APLDC 2417640 -27.7312 
Bangladesh 1684335 -26.7833 
Cambodia 676942.8 -30.1175 
Lao PDR 31069.78 -24.8033 
Myanmar 17995.54 -33.4035 
Nepal 7297.227 -23.6348 
World 13392727 7.092813 
62 (Apparel 
And Clothing 
Accessories-
Not-Knitted) 
  
APLDC 2012437 -32.4585 
Afghanistan 5.568 -30.8741 
Bangladesh 1549897 -31.6124 
Cambodia 357700.5 -33.605 
Lao PDR 72542.3 -42.0489 
Myanmar 25689.72 -39.2306 
Nepal 6601.673 -37.2442 
World 13128625 4.544949 
63 (Textile 
Articles ) 
 
APLDC 76743.27 -16.6503 
Bangladesh 69050.34 -15.6567 
Cambodia 7153.869 -25.6644 
Nepal 537.659 -24.3649 
World 2552988 17.66012 
64(Footwear) 
 
APLDC 265229.8 -48.6243 
Bangladesh 21228.54 -33.6434 
Cambodia 236497.8 -49.5098 
Lao PDR 4939.765 -80.8247 
Myanmar 2472.842 -30.0878 
World 7321575 4.790539 
Source: Author’s calculation using SMART simulation tool 
 
 
 
